Recommendations
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
Cites work
- Bayesian Implementation
- Credible implementation
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(7)- Credible implementation
- Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player
- Voluntary implementation
- Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
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