Interactive implementation
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Publication:1294101
DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0671zbMATH Open0926.91013OpenAlexW4233700877MaRDI QIDQ1294101FDOQ1294101
Authors: Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0671
Recommendations
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
Cites Work
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Credible implementation
Cited In (7)
- Credible implementation
- Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player
- Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
- Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- Voluntary implementation
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
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