Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0052-3MaRDI QIDQ869241zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam Meirowitz

Publication date 27 February 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Communication in bargaining over decision rights
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly

Cites work

• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation

Cited in

(3)

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Expert advice to a voting body
• How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation

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