Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0052-3zbMATH Open1109.91394OpenAlexW2168574421MaRDI QIDQ869241FDOQ869241

Authors: Adam Meirowitz 

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3

Recommendations

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Communication in bargaining over decision rights
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Implementation in differential information economies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models

Cited In (3)

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Expert advice to a voting body
• How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation

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