Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
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Publication:2494020
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5zbMath1096.91014MaRDI QIDQ2494020
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5
91B14: Social choice
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