A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.003MaRDI QIDQ485804zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionsubgame perfect equilibriumimplementation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
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Cites work

• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction

Cited in

(10)

• Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
• Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
• Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
• Picking the winners
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• Nash implementation of supermajority rules

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