A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

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Publication:485804

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.003zbMATH Open1302.91070OpenAlexW2031862064MaRDI QIDQ485804FDOQ485804

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003




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