A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003zbMath1302.91070OpenAlexW2031862064MaRDI QIDQ485804

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumbackward inductionimplementation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

Cites Work

• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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