Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0180-5MaRDI QIDQ535402zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat Ali Çengelci, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 11 May 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0180-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A new characterization of the majority rule
• Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• More on the majority rule: profiles, societies, and responsiveness

Cited in

(2)

• Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions

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