Public goods with congestion
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2496791
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.01.003zbMATH Open1132.91430OpenAlexW2089867004MaRDI QIDQ2496791FDOQ2496791
Authors: Oleksii Birulin
Publication date: 20 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.003
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal selling procedures with fixed costs
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
Cited In (3)
This page was built for publication: Public goods with congestion
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2496791)