Public goods with congestion
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Publication:2496791
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673817 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3712886 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Incentives in Teams
- Optimal selling procedures with fixed costs
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
- The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
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