Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2540zbMath0976.91025OpenAlexW1992333307MaRDI QIDQ1125568

Neil E. Gretsky, Joseph M. Ostroy, William R. Zame

Publication date: 6 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2540

zbMATH Keywords

differentiabilityperfect competitionsocial gains functiontransferable utility assignment model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types ⋮ Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness ⋮ Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching ⋮ Arbitrage and the flattening effect of large numbers ⋮ Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments ⋮ When Walras meets Vickrey ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach ⋮ A dual characterization of incentive efficiency. ⋮ The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market ⋮ The empirical content of marital surplus in matching models ⋮ Mergers and the market for organization capital ⋮ Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets ⋮ A duality theory of payment systems ⋮ Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms ⋮ The package assignment model. ⋮ Invariance properties of the Monge-Kantorovich mass transport problem

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