Unilateral stability in matching problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105780MaRDI QIDQ6122065zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date 27 March 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780

zbMATH Keywords

matching problemspairwise stabilityunilateral stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
• The permissible and the forbidden
• The roommates problem revisited

Cited in

(3)

• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
• The reciprocity set
• Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies

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