Setting Cournot Versus Lyapunov Games Stability Conditions and Equilibrium Point Properties

DOI10.1142/S0219198915500115zbMATH Open1331.91008OpenAlexW1912995413MaRDI QIDQ3459304FDOQ3459304

Julio B. Clempner

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198915500115

zbMATH Keywords

potential gamesCournotLyapunovshortest-pathrouting gamesbest-replydominance-solvable games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Potential games
• Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• Best-response potential games
• Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games
• On the structure of weakly acyclic games
• Learning in games by random sampling
• Weak acyclic coloring and asymmetric coloring games
• Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games

Cited In (4)

• A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies
• A Lyapunov approach for stable reinforcement learning
• On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches
• A proximal/gradient approach for computing the Nash equilibrium in controllable Markov games

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