Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
DOI10.2478/V10006-011-0026-XzbMATH Open1272.91030OpenAlexW2022024689MaRDI QIDQ2845110FDOQ2845110
Authors: Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak 
Publication date: 22 August 2013
Published in: International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10006-011-0026-x
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Cited In (15)
- Finding the strong Nash equilibrium: computation, existence and characterization for Markov games
- On Lyapunov game theory equilibrium: static and dynamic approaches
- Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games
- Dr. Alexander Semionovich Poznyak Gorbatch: biography
- Using the extraproximal method for computing the shortest-path mixed Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games
- Setting Cournot versus Lyapunov games stability conditions and equilibrium point properties
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
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- A Lyapunov approach for stable reinforcement learning
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- A proximal/gradient approach for computing the Nash equilibrium in controllable Markov games
- Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
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