Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3677900 (Why is no real title available?)
- A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
- Aggregate comparative statics
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
- Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
- Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
- Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- Public goods in networks
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
Cited in
(8)- Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria in a normal-form game and its subgames
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
- Two-group contests with communication within and between groups
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
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