Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:891328
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0452-8zbMath1388.91015OpenAlexW2044782880MaRDI QIDQ891328
Ryusuke Shinohara, Federico Quartieri
Publication date: 17 November 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0452-8
coalition-proof Nash equilibriumexternalitiesPareto dominancestrategic substitutesgeneralized aggregative games
Related Items (2)
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups ⋮ Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
- On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
- Public goods in networks
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
- Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
- Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- Aggregate comparative statics
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
This page was built for publication: Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
