Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
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Publication:891328
DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0452-8zbMATH Open1388.91015OpenAlexW2044782880MaRDI QIDQ891328FDOQ891328
Authors: Federico Quartieri, Ryusuke Shinohara 
Publication date: 17 November 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0452-8
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externalitiesPareto dominancestrategic substitutescoalition-proof Nash equilibriumgeneralized aggregative games
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- On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
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- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
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- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
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