Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_15zbMath1417.91126OpenAlexW2413612341MaRDI QIDQ4555516

Federico Quartieri, Ryusuke Shinohara

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_15

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumpayoff functioncontest success functionNash equilibrium uniquenessgeneral Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests ⋮ Optimal decision of aggregation method in group contest: going all out vs. staying half-hearted

Cites Work

• Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
• Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

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