Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal

DOI10.1007/BF01237190MaRDI QIDQ1601988zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Rudolf Kerschbamer, Clemens Puppe

Publication date 22 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237190

zbMATH Keywords

nonnormalityprivately provided public goodsvoluntary-contribution games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Voluntary contributions to a dynamic public good: experimental evidence
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Finite horizon game for voluntary provision of a discrete public good

Cited in

(21)

• The strategic advantage of being less skilled
• Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
• The patron game: the individual provision of a public good
• Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics
• Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods
• Better to give than to receive? Altruistic provision of a global public good
• Is generosity involuntary?
• On the use of public goods
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
• Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities
• Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
• Pareto improvement through unilateral matching of public good contributions: the role of commitment
• Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game
• Contributing with private bundles to public goods
• Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty: a comment
• Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty
• Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods
• Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes

This page was built for publication: Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1601988)