Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1351252
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00769-5zbMath0875.90224OpenAlexW2055893782MaRDI QIDQ1351252
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/809/1/es-3.pdf
Related Items (11)
Cooperation and strategic complementarity: an experiment with two voluntary contribution mechanism games with interior equilibria ⋮ Introduction to the special issue ``Experiments on conflicts and conflict resolution ⋮ The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment ⋮ Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence ⋮ A game-theoretic taxonomy of social dilemmas ⋮ Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ The sophistication of conditional cooperators: evidence from public goods games ⋮ Voluntary versus enforced team effort ⋮ Framing and cooperation in public good games: An experiment with an interior solution ⋮ Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
