Voluntary versus enforced team effort

DOI10.3390/G2030277zbMATH Open1311.91081OpenAlexW2111925963MaRDI QIDQ2344982FDOQ2344982

Authors Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030277

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsteam effortvoluntary collaboration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Leaving the prison: Permitting partner choice and refusal in prisoner's dilemma games
• Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with(out) an outside option: An experimental study
• Nash as an organizing principle in the voluntary provision of public goods: Experimental evidence
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• The evolution of cooperation
• Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy

Cited in

(3)

• Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?
• The market for talent: competition for resources and self-governance in teams
• Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?

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