Voluntary versus enforced team effort

DOI10.3390/g2030277zbMath1311.91081OpenAlexW2111925963MaRDI QIDQ2344982

Claude Montmarquette, Claudia Keser

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030277

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsteam effortvoluntary collaboration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Nash as an organizing principle in the voluntary provision of public goods: Experimental evidence
• Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
• Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with(out) an outside option: An experimental study
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Leaving the prison: Permitting partner choice and refusal in prisoner's dilemma games

This page was built for publication: Voluntary versus enforced team effort