Leaving the prison: Permitting partner choice and refusal in prisoner's dilemma games

DOI10.1023/A:1013866527989zbMath0989.91009OpenAlexW1585017278MaRDI QIDQ5960116

Esther Hauk

Publication date: 11 April 2002

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1013866527989

zbMATH Keywords

learningmatchingpartner selectionprisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

The prisoner's dilemma on co-evolving networks under perfect rationality ⋮ Friendship, cliquishness, and the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Voluntary versus enforced team effort

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