Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?

DOI10.1023/A:1026221318302MaRDI QIDQ1421706zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Claude Meidinger, Jean-Louis Rullière, Marie Claire Villeval

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

compensationexperimentsfree ridingteamworkpeer pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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(4)

• Voluntary versus enforced team effort
• Does the existence of ``talented outliers help improve team performance? Modeling heterogeneous personalities in teamwork
• Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?
• Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs

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