Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?

DOI10.1023/A:1026221318302zbMATH Open1074.91508MaRDI QIDQ1421706FDOQ1421706

Authors: Claude Meidinger, Jean-Louis Rullière, Marie Claire Villeval 

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

compensationexperimentsfree ridingteamworkpeer pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cited In (4)

• Voluntary versus enforced team effort
• Does the existence of ``talented outliers help improve team performance? Modeling heterogeneous personalities in teamwork
• Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs
• Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?

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