Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0189-XMaRDI QIDQ339917zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philipp E. Otto, Friedel Bolle

Publication date 11 November 2016

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0189-x

zbMATH Keywords

employee contributionhierarchical delegationpayment differentiationprincipal-agent modelspublic good participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods
• Income redistribution and public good provision: an experiment
• Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment

Cited in

(5)

• Voluntary versus enforced team effort
• Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?
• Decentralized matching markets of various sizes: similarly stable solutions with high proportions of equal splits
• On efforts in teams with stereotypes
• The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games

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