Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0189-XzbMATH Open1349.91185OpenAlexW3123406331MaRDI QIDQ339917FDOQ339917

Authors: Philipp E. Otto, Friedel Bolle 

Publication date: 11 November 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0189-x

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zbMATH Keywords

employee contributionhierarchical delegationpayment differentiationprincipal-agent modelspublic good participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods
• Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment
• Income redistribution and public good provision: an experiment

Cited In (5)

• Voluntary versus enforced team effort
• Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?
• On efforts in teams with stereotypes
• Decentralized matching markets of various sizes: similarly stable solutions with high proportions of equal splits
• The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games

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