Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.002MaRDI QIDQ6188264zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Daniel Jones, Mirco Tonin, Michael Vlassopoulos, K. Pun Winichakul

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

multitaskingperformance payprosocial motivationsorting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Labor markets (91B39)

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Cites work

• Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment
• Testing the theory of multitasking: evidence from a natural field experiment in Chinese factories
• The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes
• What motivates effort? Evidence and expert forecasts
• Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection

Cited in

(1)

• Efficiency wages with motivated agents

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