Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence
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Publication:2452246
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0658-2zbMATH Open1288.91037OpenAlexW2044698596WikidataQ60020000 ScholiaQ60020000MaRDI QIDQ2452246FDOQ2452246
Garrett Milam, Matthew McGinty
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0658-2
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Non-excludable public good experiments
- Strength of the social dilemma in a public goods experiment: An exploration of the error hypothesis
- Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
- Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison
Cited In (8)
- Cooperation and coordination in threshold public goods games with asymmetric players
- Externality and information asymmetry in the production of local public goods
- Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
- Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight
- Can we replicate real human behaviour using artificial neural networks?
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
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