Knowledge and best responses in games
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Publication:1339218
DOI10.1007/BF02032667zbMath0812.90143OpenAlexW2000993505MaRDI QIDQ1339218
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02032667
Cites Work
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Agreeing to disagree
- The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environments
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