The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001zbMath1271.91024OpenAlexW1979548792MaRDI QIDQ2457244

Yannick Viossat

Publication date: 30 October 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscorrelated equilibriumrock-paper-scissors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Replicator dynamics: old and new ⋮ Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games ⋮ Regret matching with finite memory ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Game dynamics and Nash equilibria ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Learning in games with unstable equilibria

Cites Work

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• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Adaptive Heuristics
• A general class of adaptive strategies

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