Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations

DOI10.1006/game.1995.1052zbMath0841.90143OpenAlexW2060247189MaRDI QIDQ1906715

Andrea Gaunersdorfer, Josef Hofbauer

Publication date: 6 February 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1052

zbMATH Keywords

normal form gamesShapley polygonlimiting behavior of fictitious playtime-averaged replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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