Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
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Publication:4985773
Abstract: An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team's profit is given by a convex function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.
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Cited in
(12)- Stochastic dynamic market share attraction games
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- An incentive compatible ZD strategy-based data sharing model for federated learning: a perspective of iterated prisoner's dilemma
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- Stable matching with network externalities
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- Profit sharing and efficiency in utility games
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- Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities
- Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities
- Rationality of reward sharing in multi-agent reinforcement learning
- Project games
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