Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
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Publication:4985773
DOI10.1080/15427951.2013.830164zbMATH Open1465.91011arXiv1010.5081OpenAlexW2569059396MaRDI QIDQ4985773FDOQ4985773
Authors: Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Angelo Fanelli, Dmitry Shiryaev, John Augustine, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 26 April 2021
Published in: Internet Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team's profit is given by a convex function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.5081
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