Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF01755476MaRDI QIDQ2639784zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kalyan Chatterjee, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 1990

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755476

zbMATH Keywords

Nash demand gameperfect equilibriasplit-the-difference tradeuniversal perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

A generalization of the classical Nash demand game is examined. Agents make simultaneous offers in each period as to how the pie should be divided. Incompatible offers send the game to the next period while compatible offers end the game with a split-the-difference trade. The authors study the set of perfect equilibria and the set of universal perfect equilibria (the concept of universal perfection is stronger than perfection: it requires robustness against every rather just one sequence of perturbed games).

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3228304 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3245885 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Local perfection
• On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Security Equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries
• Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(13)

• Simultaneous moves multi-person continuous time concession game
• Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing
• Strategic choice of waiting and reaction times in bargaining
• Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining
• Bargaining in uncertain environments: A systematic distortion of perfect equilibrium demands
• A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game
• Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
• Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator
• Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
• Pledge-and-review bargaining
• Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
• Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
• Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

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