Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
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Publication:3705243
DOI10.1287/moor.10.4.650zbMath0581.90098MaRDI QIDQ3705243
No author found.
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.650
Jacobian matrix; Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition; degree theory of mappings; local nonsingularity; strongly stable Nash equilibrium
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