Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
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Publication:3705243
DOI10.1287/MOOR.10.4.650zbMATH Open0581.90098OpenAlexW2045907295MaRDI QIDQ3705243FDOQ3705243
Authors:
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.650
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- On the strongly essential components of Nash equilibria of infinite \(n\)-person games with quasiconcave payoffs
- A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games
- Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: a learning approach via costs to move
- Refinements of Stationary Points with Applications to Noncooperative Games and Economics
- Continuity and equilibrium stability
- Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
- Strong active solution in non-cooperative games
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- A strong equilibrium in noncooperative games
- The strong equilibrium for noncooperative games
- Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
- Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
- Approval voting: three examples
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- On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
- Regular potential games
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
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