Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games

DOI10.1287/moor.10.4.650zbMath0581.90098OpenAlexW2045907295MaRDI QIDQ3705243

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Publication date: 1985

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.650

zbMATH Keywords

Jacobian matrixKarush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditiondegree theory of mappingslocal nonsingularitystrongly stable Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Nonlinear programming (90C30)

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