A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game

DOI10.1007/S11238-020-09782-0MaRDI QIDQ2021552zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Makoto Hagiwara, Shunsuke Hanato

Publication date 27 April 2021

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09782-0

zbMATH Keywords

claims problemconstrained equal awards ruleNash programstrategic justification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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• Fair cost allocations under conflicts - a game-theoretic point of view -

Cites work

• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
• A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
• Divide-and-permute
• Game theory
• How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
• Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(2)

• A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
• (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games

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