A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00727-ZzbMATH Open1461.91158OpenAlexW3121258842MaRDI QIDQ2021809FDOQ2021809
Authors: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh 
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ2002.pdf
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Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
- How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation
- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
- The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards.
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
- Divide-and-permute
- Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
Cited In (4)
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