A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
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Publication:2021809
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Divide-and-permute
- Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation
- Multilateral Bargaining
- New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
- Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards.
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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