Divide and choose: an informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102862zbMath1521.91151MaRDI QIDQ6114947

Jia-Wen Li, Yuan Ju

Publication date: 15 August 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumdivide-and-choosestrategic bargainingbankruptcy problemTalmud rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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