Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0039-5zbMATH Open1117.91027OpenAlexW2114335048MaRDI QIDQ852319FDOQ852319

Authors: Frank Riedel, Elmar G. Wolfstetter 

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5

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zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryMulti-unit auctionsWeak dominanceSimultaneous ascending-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Auctions of Shares
• Escaping Nash Inflation
• Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining

Cited In (4)

• Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

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