Dominance solvable English matching auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00072-5MaRDI QIDQ1867792zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionsstrategiesMatching marketsIterated elimination of dominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance

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