Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
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Publication:1867792
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00072-5zbMath1037.91038MaRDI QIDQ1867792
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A18: Games in extensive form
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B68: Matching models
Cites Work
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