Dominance solvable English matching auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00072-5zbMATH Open1037.91038MaRDI QIDQ1867792FDOQ1867792

Authors: Ulrich Kamecke 

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

English auctionsstrategiesMatching marketsIterated elimination of dominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
• Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction

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