Dominance solvability of large k-price auctions

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1880MaRDI QIDQ2867501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaron Azrieli, Dan Levin

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1880

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitydominance solvabilitylarge auctions\(k\)-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability

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