Dominance solvability of large k-price auctions

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1880zbMATH Open1277.91061OpenAlexW2023098247MaRDI QIDQ2867501FDOQ2867501

Authors: Yaron Azrieli, Dan Levin 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1880

Recommendations

• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitydominance solvabilitylarge auctions\(k\)-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (7)

• Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions

This page was built for publication: Dominance solvability of large \(k\)-price auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2867501)