Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.008MaRDI QIDQ645636zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaron Azrieli, Dan Levin

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitycommon valuedominance solvabilitylarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Dominance solvability of large \(k\)-price auctions
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5819433 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3313523 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Admissibility in Games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

Cited in

(5)

• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Dominance solvability of large \(k\)-price auctions
• The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

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