On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90225-9zbMATH Open1328.91130OpenAlexW2072443464MaRDI QIDQ899875FDOQ899875

Dan Levin

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90225-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Decision theory for games (91A35) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Cites Work

• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

Cited In (3)

• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
• Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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