Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27zbMATH Open1206.91040OpenAlexW2137660667MaRDI QIDQ3608852FDOQ3608852

Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun, Kazuo Iwama, Toyotaka Tasaka, Xiaotie Deng

Publication date: 6 March 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (5)

• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction

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