Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27MaRDI QIDQ3608852zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun, Toyotaka Tasaka, Xiaotie Deng, Kazuo Iwama

Publication date 6 March 2009

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(5)

• Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction

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