Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.05.004MaRDI QIDQ2016244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionspeer-to-peer lendingsocial lending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962848 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119764 (Why is no real title available?)
• An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid
• Asymptotic prices in uniform-price multi-unit auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Cheap labor can be expensive
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Competitive auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi- unit demands
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
• Frugality in path auctions
• Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand
• Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
• Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence

Cited in

(3)

• Dynamic auction mechanism of online peer-to-peer lending market considering bilateral sealed bidding
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7112427 (Why is no real title available?)
• Tokenization of distributed insurance by auction

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