Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.05.004zbMATH Open1296.91124OpenAlexW2156951735MaRDI QIDQ2016244FDOQ2016244

Authors: Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert 

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.004

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionspeer-to-peer lendingsocial lending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Optimal Auction Design
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi- unit demands
• Competitive auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Frugality in path auctions
• Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
• Cheap labor can be expensive
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
• Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
• Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand
• Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
• Asymptotic prices in uniform-price multi-unit auctions
• Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence
• An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Tokenization of distributed insurance by auction

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