The dynamic Vickrey auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.07.004zbMATH Open1282.91139OpenAlexW2076322160MaRDI QIDQ2437814FDOQ2437814

Authors: Konrad Mierendorff 

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.004

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionmultidimensional typesdynamic allocation problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Incentives in Teams
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions

Cited In (17)

• Auction timing and market thickness
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
• Progressive participation
• Online incentive-compatible mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• Flow auctions
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
• Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
• On Vickrey-type auction procedures
• On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules

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