Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339zbMath1232.91295OpenAlexW1963767359MaRDI QIDQ3115464

Charles M. Kahn, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbidding collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects ⋮ Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints ⋮ Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

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