Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.016MaRDI QIDQ765224zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ryuji Sano

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsascending auctioncore-selecting auctionfree-rider problempackage clock auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Combinatorial auction design
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(4)

• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Free riding in combinatorial first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

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