Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
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Publication:765224
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.016zbMATH Open1279.91090OpenAlexW2066962369MaRDI QIDQ765224FDOQ765224
Authors: Ryuji Sano 
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016
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Cites Work
- Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
- Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
- Combinatorial auction design
- On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
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