Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00691-3zbMATH Open1437.91213OpenAlexW2963657043MaRDI QIDQ2178647FDOQ2178647

Oleg Baranov, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Publication date: 11 May 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00691-3

Recommendations

• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionVCG mechanismcore-selecting auctionVickrey auctionspectrum auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Incentives in Teams
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

Cited In (11)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions
• Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification

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