On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_20zbMATH Open1435.91098OpenAlexW2989905393MaRDI QIDQ777973FDOQ777973

Evangelos Markakis, Artem Tsikiridis

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_20

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Knapsack auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

Cited In (3)

• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions

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