Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.003MaRDI QIDQ550207zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ryuji Sano

Publication date 8 July 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

ascending proxy auctioncore-selecting auctionpackage auctionsingle-minded bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Core-selecting package auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

Cites work

• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Core-selecting package auctions
• The package assignment model.
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(12)

• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
• Core-selecting package auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions

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