Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.003zbMATH Open1217.91078OpenAlexW2017295041MaRDI QIDQ550207FDOQ550207

Authors: Ryuji Sano 

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003

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zbMATH Keywords

package auctionascending proxy auctioncore-selecting auctionsingle-minded bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Core-selecting package auctions
• The package assignment model.
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Cited In (9)

• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions

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