Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.05.005MaRDI QIDQ2373792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

aftermarketsauctionsrisk attitude

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
• Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
• Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Cites work

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition

Cited in

(5)

• Fixed costs matter even when the costs are sunk
• Right to choose in oral auctions
• Auctions of licences and market structure
• Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition
• Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

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