Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.05.005zbMATH Open1156.91352OpenAlexW1985784391MaRDI QIDQ2373792FDOQ2373792

Authors: Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev 

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.005

Recommendations

• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
• Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
• Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

zbMATH Keywords

aftermarketsauctionsrisk attitude

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition

Cited In (5)

• Fixed costs matter even when the costs are sunk
• Auctions of licences and market structure
• Right to choose in oral auctions
• Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition
• Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

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