Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

DOI10.3390/G4040738MaRDI QIDQ2351256zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Todd Swarthout, Jason Shachat

Publication date 23 June 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040738

zbMATH Keywords

auctionforward inductionloss avoidanceultimatum bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Summary: We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.

Recommendations

• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
• Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play
• Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• The alternating double auction market. A game theoretic and experimental investigation

Cites work

• Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
• Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Markets for contracts: Experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games
• Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games

Cited in

(3)

• On the impact of an intermediary agent in the ultimatum game
• Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games

This page was built for publication: Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2351256)