Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00395.xzbMath1145.91335OpenAlexW2130728920MaRDI QIDQ5488499

Theo Offerman, Jan Potters

Publication date: 22 September 2006

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00395.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game ⋮ Searching for the sunk cost fallacy ⋮ Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: a social dilemma experiment ⋮ Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining ⋮ Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

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