Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00395.XzbMATH Open1145.91335OpenAlexW2130728920MaRDI QIDQ5488499FDOQ5488499

Authors Theo Offerman, Jan Potters 

Publication date 22 September 2006

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00395.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (5)

• Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection
• To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
• Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: a social dilemma experiment
• Searching for the sunk cost fallacy
• Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining

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