To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

DOI10.3390/g9030041zbMath1418.91133OpenAlexW2810565375WikidataQ129649268 ScholiaQ129649268MaRDI QIDQ1630447

Martin Sefton, Florian Heine

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030041

zbMATH Keywords

experimentpublic goodcontestsunk costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE
• hreg

Cites Work

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• Price competition between teams
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• Searching for the sunk cost fallacy
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study
• On a Test of Whether one of Two Random Variables is Stochastically Larger than the Other
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