Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games

DOI10.1023/A:1025309121659MaRDI QIDQ1409765zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David J. Cooper, Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, Rami Zwick

Publication date 22 October 2003

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1025309121659

zbMATH Keywords

learningbargainingGame Theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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(11)

• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Fairness and learning: An experimental examination
• Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection
• Strategic risk and response time across games
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Economic harmony: an epistemic theory of economic interactions
• Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
• Efficiency in the trust game: an experimental study of precommitment
• Competing against experienced and inexperienced players

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