Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games
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Publication:1409765
DOI10.1023/A:1025309121659zbMATH Open1135.91322OpenAlexW2125519528MaRDI QIDQ1409765FDOQ1409765
Authors: David J. Cooper, Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, Rami Zwick 
Publication date: 22 October 2003
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1025309121659
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