Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_1MaRDI QIDQ6535796zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Robin Fritsch, Younjoo Lee, Adrian Meier, Ye Wang, Roger Wattenhofer

Publication date 28 February 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_1

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionscore-selecting payment rulesnon-decreasing payment rulesoverbiddingVGC-nearest payment rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

In this paper, the authors study payment rules for welfare maximizing known single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs) in which each bidder is interested in a single known bundle. The profile of desired bundles together with the profile of bids define a number of linear constraints (the core constraints) which form a polytope (the core). It has been shown that bidders can sometimes decrease their payments by announcing higher-than-truthful bids under the VN payment rule. The limitations of VN payments are studied. It is shown that the non-decreasing property holds whenever a single effective core constraint exists. More precisely, the authors introduce a graph-based representation of CAs and construct a conflict graph based on the overlap between the desired bundles of the bidders. Sufficient conditions on the conflict graph are obtained to have a single effective core constraint.\N\NFor the entire collection see [Zbl 1535.68009].

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Cites work

• Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• Incentives in Teams
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions

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