Collusion or sniping in simultaneous ascending auctions -- a prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1142/S021919891100285XMaRDI QIDQ2907965zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sascha Füllbrunn

Publication date 4 September 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmulti unit auctionsprisoners's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions
• Shills and snipes
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Collusion via resale

Cites work

• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• The observed choice problem in estimating the cost of policies

Cited in

(3)

• Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions
• Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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