Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects

DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0006-ZzbMath1124.91022OpenAlexW2077468253MaRDI QIDQ862754

Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano, Stefano Lovo

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0006-z

zbMATH Keywords

FCC auctionsCollusionAscending auctions for multiple objectsClock auctionsRetaliation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
• Escaping Nash Inflation
• A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

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